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ABSTRACT
Malcolm Vick and Lai Kuan Lim
James Cook University
The paper starts from the claim that research has become
highly serious business, which it characterises as 'stuff'. It
analyses the concerns it takes up, the good/s it offers, and
the claims it makes or are made for it. It notes the current
context of regulation or research and the responses these
call forth, in the form of markers of quality. It argues,
however, that the refinement of these markers and the
extension of the scope of their application in a globalising
research industry, has potentially negative impacts on
academics in many parts of the world, and thus undermines
attempts to pursue some of its concerns. It not only argues
for, but seeks to embody, an approach to research which
deliberately problematises and challenges common
practices for claiming to offer truth and to direct practice.
In short, the paper argues for a 'lighter', more modest
approach to research, which it characterises as 'fluff'.
Research has become such serious business. Saving the world, in fact.
If this sounds like an unlikely proposition, go back to the RQF and the notion
of impact. Impact: how much effect it had – not on scholarship, or academic
debate but the ‘real world’. And it remains in the new Rudd ERA.
Of course, research is not alone in such serious ambitions. Policy seems to
share the same goal. It doesn’t take much time to track down some most
extraordinary claims for, say ‘partnerships’ policies – from promoting optimal
child development, through saving threatened species of cockatoo to solving
water shortages in Africa (one of us has given a critical survey of such
policies and their claims in a paper from an earlier AARE paper).
Like these policies, much research in social sciences, particularly, education,
identifies marginalised groups of individuals, and designs ‘help’ solutions that
‘emancipate’, ‘liberate’, ‘empower’. Luke, for instance, argues that critical
discourse analysis has ‘the productive potential to capture, describe, and
critique a broader range of normative orders of discourse, including those that
construct and transform knowledge and power relations in productive,
equitable, and enfranchising ways’ (p. 106). These ‘help’ or ‘transformative’
solutions often articulate the injustices, suggest improvements, argue for
equalising opportunities, call for transformations in society and so on, which
reflect the idealism of the Enlightenment as well as a quest for cost-efficient
progress in a neo-liberal, post-Fordist era. Such research takes the position of
the voice for the oppressed and for those who have been silenced. By
M Vick. Partnership in
teacher education: historical
perspectives on recent
rhetoric. AARE 2006 –
paper VIC06146.Luke, A. (2002). Beyond
science and ideology
critique: developments in
critical discourse analysis.
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2‘theorising’ who needs ‘help’ and what ‘help’ is ‘helpful’, and by drawing
from ‘helpful’ evidence of ‘what helps’ from other ‘helpful’ research, it
claims the capacity to express the voice of those who may not have the social
capital to enter into a dialogue with policy makers and scientists. In so doing,
research presents ‘these’ people as an issue to ‘help’, as a ‘case’ to study, as
‘subjects’ to theorize, along with ‘narratives’ to analyse, and opinions to
measure and evaluate.
Thinking about research as this sort of serious business also raises questions
about how the ways research seeks to correct, reform and to do good,
simultaneously enable and undermine its capacity to save the world. On one
level, the contemporary neo-liberal research regime demands research that
can be quantified and measured and tied to tangible outcomes. On another, the
serious business of research is also precisely that – a serious business – a
globalised industry whose economic imperatives entail the capacity to
distract, detract, and disrupt the serious business of saving the world.
Such high seriousness – such high stakes. We’d better get it right. We’d better
knuckle down to the task.
In April 2008, the education postgraduate students at JCU
mounted what they called an Educarnival for the
undergraduates, under the slogan ‘In Happy Horse we trust’.
Figure 1: Happy Horse; JCU Education Postgraduate
students, April 2008
I (Vick) emailed them my thanks and (an) appreciation:
It was light, insubstantial, trivial, fun… actually totally unnecessary
– a non-determined, not required activity. You didn’t have to do it.
It’s hard to work out which heading to put it under in your CVs.
(‘designed a happy horse logo’; ‘came up with slogan “in happy
horse we trust” ’ – they’re not going to get you a lectureship).
But you did it.
And in doing it (and here, indulge my penchant for interpretive
excess) you actually, practically, built community, modelled
generosity. You modelled the practice of the unnecessary – of the
‘over and above’. That’s one way to say what (I think) LKL gets at
fluff (n.) 
1790, variant of floow
"wooly substance, down,
nap" (1589), perhaps from
Flem. vluwe, from Fr. velu
"shaggy, hairy," from L.
vellus "fleece," or L. villus
"tuft of hair" (see velvet).
OED suggests fluff as "an
onomatopoeic modification"
of floow, "imitating the
action of puffing away some
light substance." The verb
meaning "to shake into a
soft mass" is first attested
1885. Slang bit of fluff
"young woman" is from
1903.
For an interesting piece that
critiques while not entirely
escaping from the problems
entailed in ‘helping’ – and,
incidentally, relates to a later
section of our paper -- see
the editorial for the first
issue of Globalisation,
Societies and Education,
esp. p. 4.
3with her ‘discourse of love’. And of ‘fluff’. (email: Vick to Fleming,
Navin, Maley & Halbert, 5 April 2008).
Talking of fluff: there’s a Milan Kundera: novel The Joke. In which
Kundera talks about ‘long march’ understandings of history
(which, here, I think we can translates as ‘understandings of
research’) – he’s writing in Stalinist eastern Europe and the
communist sense of the ongoing struggle for proletarian victory
over capital for the liberation of humankind). ‘Long march’
research is research that sees itself as part of the Grand Plan for
Saving the World.
That sense of the long march, it seems, underpins how we (collectively,
culturally) normalize education. Belgian historian of education Marc Depaepe
among others, and following Foucault, talks about the ‘educationalising’ of
life – turning the whole of life into the serious business of looking for
teachable moments – and its counterpart and corollary, the endless quest for
self improvement.
In contrast to what we have called fluff (and to stop worrying about binaries
for a moment), we might call this approach the concern with stuff. ‘Long
March’ research. The relentless and ruthless pursuit of seriousness – the
insistence that our research contributes to the salvation of the planet.
Earnestness.
Don’t get us wrong. We’re not against reading a lot, thinking hard, analysing
and arguing rigorously. We’re not at all against research that has potential
‘value’. (In our own ways, we both do [this kind of] stuff ourselves.). But we
think we should take ourselves with a grain of salt. Not thinking of ourselves
(and we don’t mean just us – Lim and Vick) more highly (or seriously) than
we ought (that’s from the bible). Recognising our own contingency, holding
ourselves with a degree of irony (that’s from my [Vick’s] bible – Rorty’s
wonderful Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity).
So, without sounding too serious, this is the context in which we saw
Educarnival and its wonderfully irreverent symbol, happy horse:
Celebration. Generosity. (love, even!) Fun. Music. T-shirts. Food.
The  works. And all that under a banner that was not about saving
the world, not about being serious, not about constructing a
smarter strategy for using smartboard or point 7 of the professional
standards. It wasn’t even about ‘being a teacher’ or ‘constructing a
professional identity’. But it embodied – without talking about – a
mode of professionalism, and a form of professional identity. And,
what’s more that mode of professionalism and form of professional
identity wasn’t limited to -- did disrupt -- hegemonic discourses of
education, professionalism etc. (email: Vick to Fleming, Navin,
Maley & Halbert, 5 April 2008)
One of the students (ir)responsible for Happy Horse and Educarnival replied
in kind:
I think it's great that happy horse was a
completely detached icon of educarnival and
Kundera, M. (1993) The
Joke. NY: Harper.Depaepe, M. (1998).
Educationalisation: a key
concept in understanding the
basic processes in the
history of Western
education. History of
Education Review 27(2) 16-
28.Rorty, R. (1989).
Contingency, Irony, and
Solidarity. Cambridge, NY:
CUP
4that all happy's frivolity did cut through
hegemonic practices, by for instance not
using 'discovery' or an image of a ship and
having the mix of 'performances' from
students and staff. (email: Halbert to Vick,
5 April 2008)
Well. Enough of this frivolity. Let’s get down to business.
The remainder of the paper is a mixture of reflection on and argument about
research – about aspects of its organisation as a social and economic/business
practice, about the policing of its practices, about how we make claims about
the legitimacy of those practices and about the claims we make about the
value of the research that results from them. We also ask whether the
foundations of such ‘stuff’ are sufficiently solid to warrant coupling it to such
ambitions to advance good causes, and indeed, whether its claims   to being
‘stuff’ can in fact be sustained. Finally, we suggest that even the attempt to
pursue such stuff might be riddled with contradictions, by considering its
impact on substantial parts of the world it appears to be seeking to save.
In writing this paper, we have been acutely aware of what research looks like,
and how this paper needs to both mediate normalised research, and at the
same time, stand apart, and consider whether there are other ways to play out
the identity and image of research. At each stage of our conceptualisation and
reconceptualisation, writing and rewriting, editing and finessing, we searched
in our research for the form that fits and, also, for the mis-fits that have the
capacity to inform and reform our research conduct and product. Given our
concern with education research, social problematisation and the production
of social justice ‘products’ that epitomise the notion of ‘help’, of saving the
world, we therefore, quite intentionally, draw on Gerwitz and Cribb’s plural
models of justice as our framework for presenting both our research, and the
research we talk about.
Gerwitz and Cribb conceptualised social justice along six dimensions: kind of
concern, kind of good, kind of claim, scope of models of justice, scope of
allocative principles and scope of responsibility. We concede that it might
appear to be drawing a long bow to argue that these six dimensions
characterise the key research questions of ‘what’, ‘why’, ‘how’ and ‘where’.
However, the very premise of this pluralistic model is that there are various
ways of conceptualising, producing and representing the notion of help. We
see their concerns, and their approach, as contiguous to our own, and think
they offer a basis, albeit a loose, broad one, which we doubtless over-extend,
to reflect on the spectrum of ‘help’ research.
This paper examines the manifestations and intent of the research product
using three of these dimensions: kind of concern, kind of good and kind of
claim. What research looks at, how research is produced and represented, we
argue, are subjected to the new ethics, in the Foucauldian sense, that governs
researchers’ conduct in relation to themselves and others. Bernadette Baker
argues that there is a ‘preferred discourse on conduct’ in teaching, through
which teachers are examined, differentiated and judged (p. 55). Likewise, weGewirtz, S. & Cribb, A.
(2002). Plural conceptions
of social justice:
implications for policy
sociology. Journal of
Education Policy, 17(5),
499-509.Baker, B. (2005). State-
formation, teaching
techniques, and
globalization as aporia.
Discourse: Studies in the
cultural politics of
education, 26(1), 45-77.
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partly unwritten) that capture, define, discipline and govern not only the
practice and production of research, but also the dissemination, circulation
and consumption of the knowledge that research produces.
Kind(s) of concern
Research, we recognise, is not monolithic – even within disciplines or fields
(or subdisciplines and subfields). Educational research displays a range of
types of concern, manifested in aims, purposes, ends. The kind of concern in
social justice, Gerwitz and Cribb argue, may be specifically about redressing
the inequitable distribution of resources, or it may be more encompassing, to
include the re-affirmation of  marginalised cultures in the form cultural
justice, and re-positioning the marginalised as decision makers in the form of
associational justice. These forms of social justice are articulated explicitly
and implicitly across competing, and conflicting ideological agenda in
education research. Equally, the kinds of concern that are fashioned and
refashioned in research have the capacity to draw ideological boundaries
defining and delimiting which concerns are worthy of research. Quite
intentionally, then, we adopt the (incongruous) categories, ‘fluff’ and ‘stuff’,
to parody, and draw critical attention to, prevailing divisions between what
research and research concerns are worthy and what are not.
What are ‘fluff’ concerns? How are these concerns positioned against and
alongside ‘stuff’ concerns? We distinguish ‘fluff’ concerns by what they are
concerned about, and by how they are positioned. ‘Fluff’ concerns are
theoretical indulgence concerns that may not set out to identify a list of
recommendations and strategies to address the specific social/educational
problem from which the research problem derives. However, like stuff, fluff
might also present a strategic intent to ‘help’, to ‘save the world’. But for
fluff, transformation begins in the shifting of the mind, and the elaboration
and refinement of the abstract. As such, it may be more preoccupied with
intellectual play than with intellectual – and social – work. What ‘fluff’
concerns contribute might be like teachers’ work, of which Connell notes that
whilst ‘a great deal of work is done… this work does not produce any things’.
So, while the sort of research we are characterising as fluff might not provide
programmatic solutions or direct people what they should do about particular
problems, it might, however, pose provocative and plausible questions that
suggest possible directions for, and implore, reflection, and offer insights that
refine particular understandings of particular knowledges.
‘Fluff’ concerns, we suggest, are also concerns that are peripheral to what is
(construed to be) important in a particular context and time. Take, for
instance, the dozen special interest groups of AARE:
Assessment and Measurement
Distributed Learning Environment and Multicultural Issues
Doctoral Education Research
Early Childhood
Educational Leadership and Management
c.f., Sinclair, M. (2002).
Social justice in education in
Australia, c. 1983-1996.
History of Education
Review, 31(2), 74-86.
Connell, R.W. (1985).
Teachers’ Work. North
Sydney: Allen & Unwin, p.
70.
We weren’t able to find
much literature that uses
either of these categories,
but Colin Lankshear drew
our attention to a paper of
his which talks about stuff
(The stuff of New
Literacies, Mary Lou Fulton
Symposium, 2007; we found
it at
www.geocities.com/c.lanks
hear/stuff.pdf) although he
uses the term rather
differently, to refer to the
‘substance’ of things,
whereas we use it more in
the sense of ‘self important’,
with an inflated sense of its
own worth.
6Educational Philosophy and Theory
Gender and Sexualities
Health and Physical Education
Information and Communication Technology
Motivation and Learning
Sociocultural and Activity Theory
Social Justice
The existence of such collectivities as SIGs, and of individual SIGs
themselves, have complex histories in which their significances have differed
across groups and across time. However, we suggest, they have come to
represent the curriculum of education research: the structuring of whole
conferences around SIGs implicitly, if not explicitly, frames, regulates and
imposes a structure of defining relevance and value in research. Effectively,
what the existence and this use of SIGs asks, and answers is, ‘What kind of
concern is of greater concern?’ These groups represent the kinds of concern
that are considered worthy of special interest. This, we think, occurs whether
the interest group reflects dominant research interests and paradigms (critical,
qualitative research) or currently more marginalised interests, where ‘special’
has signalled a need to defend (implicitly important) territory from attack and
further marginalisation. The nett effect, we suggest, is to establish the worth
of some kinds of concern at the expense of others[A1].
This seems curiously at odds with a point Luke made a few years ago:
Yet new times may require an expanded research agenda, one that
focuses not just on the suppression of disaporic identities by dominant
classes. Needed is one that engages with new textual configurations,
one that de-reifies concepts of culture, and explores new definitions
not only of discourse, but as well of language as necessarily blended,
multiglossic, and transcultural. This will require that linguists and
sociologists alike question the essentialist symmetries between
language, culture, and nation that we continue to take for granted. It
also indicates that a nonessentialist focus on blended forms of local
“social cognition” (van Dijk, 1993), “cultural models” (Gee, 1999)
and “members’ resources” (Fairclough, 1992) may offer key insights
into the “glocalized” (Robertson, 1992) uptake and use of
transnational flows of discourses, images, and texts.
Another way in which (some) kinds of research concerns are established as
worthy – important – substantial – is through the claims about the seriousness
(depth, profundity) of the knowledge they (seek to) produce. Thus, for
instance, there is a widely shared (and promoted, as in the induction kit for
novice academic researchers by Boden, Kenway and Epstein) that important
concerns warrant research that aims to ‘tackle fundamental [A2]questions’ and
to gain a ‘deeper understanding’, and that therefore requires explicit
theorisation of the research problem.
But stop for just a minute. Where’s the sort of thing that Erica
McWilliam did in her sparkly Surviving Best Practice . There also
Luke, Beyond science and
ideology critique.
Boden, R., Kenway, J. &
Epstein, B. (2005). Getting
Started on Research.
London: Sage.
McWilliam, E. (2002).
Surviving best practice.
Sydney: UNSW Press
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Contingency, either. But perhaps that doesn’t matter. They were,
in the language we used earlier, probably fluff rather than stuff.
After all, Erica didn’t have footnotes and references, so perhaps it
wasn’t serious. And Rorty based at least the first part of
Contingency (the section about contingency, in fact), on a
Nabakoff novel…. A novel!... That’s not either very serious, surely,
or very scientific, certainly. (But we haven’t got to the bit about
science, yet, so we’d better hold off on this point.)
Kind(s) of good
Research offers a variety of kinds of good, and of kinds of goods.
Some research is concerned principally simply with generating knowledge,
with no explicit or immediate purpose beyond itself – what we might think of,
with apologies to Veblen, as conspicuous intellectual activity. Other research
is largely concerned with showing what’s wrong. With critique. With
identification and analysis of problems. And yet a third type of research tells
us what we should do.
An aside: We don’t know, of course, if you’ve read Rose’s discussion of
Irigaray’s way of writing as an ongoing asking of questions that are not
designed for answering, and, if you have, what you thought of it, but we
quite like it for the way it problematises work that aims at producing
certainties to tell others.
Each of these – knowing something, recognising and understanding how
something is not working out well for some people or our environment, and
knowing how we might respond – can be seen as a Good Thing, a form of
good. We might pause to ask what kinds of goods each of these produces, in
the forms of knowledge, orientation and capacity.
At the most modest level, we might want to claim that each of these adds to
the sum total of knowledge. Such a claim is, however, contestable. Because a
research good/product is produced, does not necessarily mean that it does
‘add’ – or at least in any significant or substantial way (even on the most
modest of scales). Certainly, materially, it does add: one more paper, one
more presentation, one more book, one more item on the database. However,
what it ‘adds’ to the sum total of knowledge is neither the same for all
outputs/goods, nor a certainty. Some research is cited more than others, some
research remains for a long time uncited or cited in places that do not hold
research currency within current hegemonic formations of research fields. So,
the kind of good a research good/product can be, and can do, is contingent on
where the research is situated, and how it is positioned in relationship to both
its immediate context and the broader context of prevailing research interests
and norms – to other goods in the economy of knowledge.
Thinking about research in terms of goods as well as good -- in terms of a
research economy – lets us notice how the range of research goods isRose, G. (2003). A body of
questions, in M. Pryke, G.
Rose & S. Whatmore (eds),
Using social theory:
thinking through research
(pp. 47-64). London: SAGE
in association with The
Open University.
8organised on various levels, pitted against and aligned with varying purposes,
but also varying forms and degrees of prestige – high status journals and
publishing houses, theoretical as against ‘merely’ descriptive research, types
of research grants (contracts and tenders as against ACGs), work for academic
audiences as against work for professional practitioners, and so on.
Kind(s) of claims
Even though these types or dimensions of research and the good/s they
produce are quite disparate, they share one important feature: a concern for
truth. Even work that can hardly be imagined to make a difference to the
world we live in (history of education, for instance) is concerned with the
truth.
Truth is mediated by the deployment of theory. Thus, Boden, Kenway and
Epstein argue that ‘Research without a theoretical framework is description
and does not qualify as academic research or as a contribution to knowledge’
(p. 40). Theory is not only positioned as imperative to produce knowledge of
intellectual and social merit, but the absence of it denounces its status as
knowledge. To make a claim that is recognised as ‘valid’, the production of
the claims adheres and regulates itself to the conditions of what Petersen
refers to as ‘academicity’. The kind of claim of academicity is positioned
against the kind of claim by other knowledge producers, specifically
politicians, journalists, laymen (often research subjects). The process of
subjectification by which we take on and enact an ‘academic researcher’
identity involves making and marking the particular kinds of claim about our
work: as ‘measured’, ‘rigorous’, ‘objective’, ‘critical’, ‘theorised’,
‘empirical’. The contrast however, between the kind of claims by academics
and non-academics is on the one hand diminished with the increasing
interpenetration of the discourses we/they use, and on the other, differentiated
by an increasing regulation of the conditions of making true claims. This
process of increasing scientific differentiation is evident by greater
impositions on choice of theory, methodology and evidence.
At the same time, research is judged on the basis of its theoretical choices
(with ‘rival’ theoretical camps loud in their dismissal of others’ approaches)
and, within a given ‘camp’, measured by how accurately it adheres to the
integrity of its theoretical framework. Elias’s concern about theoretical
fanaticism seems pertinent here:
Scientifically thinking groups are generally groups which
criticize or reject the dominant and commonly accepted ideas
of their society, even when these are upheld by authorities,
for they have found that they do not correspond to the
observable facts. In other words, scientists are destroyers of
myths. By factual observation, they endeavour to replace
myths, religious ideas, metaphysical speculations and all
unproven images of natural processes with theories –
testable, verifiable and correctable by factual observation.
Science’s task of hunting down myths and exposing general
Boden, Kenway & Epstein,
Getting Started on
Research.Petersen, E. B. (2007).
Negotiating academicity:
postgraduate research
supervision as category
boundary work. Studies in
Higher Education, 32(4),
475-487.Elias, N. (1970). What is
Sociology?  Oxford:
Blackwell.
9beliefs as unfounded in fact will never be accomplished. For
both within and beyond groups of scientific specialists,
people are always turning scientific theories into belief
systems. They extend the theories and use them in ways
divorced from the theoretically directed of investigation of
facts. (p. 52)
Despite their claims to the pursuit of intellectual values such as rigour and
theoretical sophistication, the deployment of these discourses of truth can be
paralleled to the production of machines. For instance, in marking time along
production nomenclature, Ford and post-Ford with theoretical epochs, of
structuralism and poststructuralism, and on a product level, the principal flow
of knowledge is the production of texts – journals, books, textbooks,
conference proceedings, and so on; the conditions of how claims are made
and represented cannot be isolated from economic imperatives. As in the
production of cars with a new and improved model each year, the production
of claims is new and improved, with post-structuralism often represented as
having greater validity than structuralism. For instance, the theorisation of
power as unidirectional, is (often seen as) less sophisticated than its
theorisation as multidirectional, fluid, amorphous. While an analysis may
embrace a theoretical framework assiduously, it may not fit with the
epistemological moment and trend. The elaboration and refinement of
knowledge involves redefining the boundary of ‘validity’, contesting what
knowledge and theoretical frameworks are ‘invalid’ or ‘obsolete’, like a car
model. Using a theoretical framework that fits with theoretical epoch and
moment, is contingent not on how research is performed, but also where it is
performed (site of publications), and for whom it is performed (theoretical
and ideological positions of reviewers). Equally, methodology that involves
hybridity, inter-disciplinary or mixing quantitative and qualitative methods is
also positioned to be more sophisticated in the kind of claims they make and
possibly, closer to ‘truth’ claims. Drawing on research that is contemporary,
particularly, in the recent five years, also adds to the validity of the
knowledge, as if knowledge has a used by date like cheese and milk. Equally,
the sophistication in drawing links between research that is contemporary
with ‘classic’ canons of knowledge also adds to the rigour of the knowledge.
Whether we’re interested in truth, in railing against how things are, or in
changing the world, then, we need to be confident we have some grip on
reality and truth.
Enter Methodology
(We wondered whether to put this paragraph in the previous section, as one
form or dimension of research. Placed there, we wrote it thus): Some research
is concerned with methodology. (Not everyone would, in fact, call
methodological work ‘research’, but we think it has the hallmarks of research
broadly considered – almost as a branch of epistemological research.) That
gets closer to the pursuit of seriousness because, at its heart, it is about how
we can establish the truth. Even methodological work that informs research
that eschews any strong notion of truth is concerned to establish the
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legitimacy – the sense in which it can be said to be true – of that research.
And here, perhaps we might think of Bronwyn Davies’ work on collective
memory as a means to explore questions of subjectification: her work clearly
argues a case or its own credibility and legitimacy, based, in part on the
theorising of its objects and subjects of knowledge and of the relations
between them.
So let’s look at some of the claims of and for methodology. And we won’t be
too discriminatory – we’re happy to be quite inclusive. (And again, in case
you think we’re just taking cheap shots at others, [some of] these are our own
methods, too – we’re as much under fire, under interrogation, as anyone else.)
Documentary research. Surveys. Tests. Structured, semi structured and
unstructured interviews. Observation. Even mixed methods. All methods for
generating data, each with their own rules for ensuring credibility of data.
That is, truth, to some degree. Rasch analysis. Structural equation modelling.
Descriptive statistics. Discourse analysis. Critical discourse analysis.
Narrative analysis. Content analysis. Etc. All methods for processing data,
each with their own rules for ensuring credibility of data.
There is a problem with truth, though. Research products that maintain and
represent the integrity of currently accepted theoretical and methodological
frameworks are representative of technologies for the production of truth, but
do not represent ‘truth’ beyond those technologies.
Whatever, the problems with truth (and truth itself has become such an
unfashionable word – it’s easier to get away with talking about ‘credibility’,
or more technical terms such as ‘validity’) we still (collectively and
individually, in so far as we take up the culture of research as our own) want
our work to manifest the markers of quality. These include, internally to our
research, the demonstration of methodological rigour &/or integrity. They
also include demonstrated knowledge of and capacity to manipulate the
apparatus of scholarship -- to quote and reference (not in comment boxes in
the way we’ve done here) in ‘appropriate’ manner (APA, Harvard) the
‘appropriate’ literature. Adherence to word limit. Formatting conventions.
Appropriate ‘voice’ for the genre (knowing when ‘first person’ is OK). One of
(what we find) the more interesting and strange markers of research quality,
manifested in the capacity to demonstrate ‘proper’ ‘objectivity’ in research,
even in work that is avowedly not ‘objective’, is the deferral of critique from
authors to the research itself, as though the research, or the research artefact
(the book, the paper) were themselves subjects with a life of their own,
making claims of themselves and on their own behalf. Externally, markers
include such things as refereed status, and citation rates and impact factors –
not very widely used in our fields – yet – but surely heading our way. And, of
course, in recent years, in Australia, ‘the DEST list’.
Thus, a paper such as this, while embodying some of the current expectations
of academic discourse, and its procedures for establishing its truths, also sits
outside of, and transgresses those procedures and the boundaries they describe
(count the errors in grammar; the switches in font, the mix of voices and
tones, the apparent disregard if not disdain for a range of conventions). YetFairly clearly, this argument
comes straight from
Foucault; e.g., Foucault, M.
(1976) History of Sexuality,
volume 1. London: Allen
Lane.Davies, B. (2000). A Body of
Writing, 1990-1999. Walnut
Creek: AltaMira Press; c.f.,
Davies, B. & Gannon, S.
(2005). Feminism/
Poststructuralism, in B.
Somekh & C. Lewin (eds),
Research Methods in the
Social Sciences (pp. 318-
325). London: Sage.
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(arguably), it still falls within the sphere of normative communicative
products.
The regulation of research
The production of research and its conformity to the rules of conforming to
criteria of worth, and the generation of appropriate goods (in both senses) is
intensively and extensively regulated – externally (by governments),
collectively by ourselves both through our institutions (these overlap with
government), and individually by many, of not all of us, as we seek to
demonstrate our worth to ourselves and our peers, and as we review (and
judge) each other’s work.
Thus, we think we can detect pressures to conform to such definitions of
worth (although we haven’t done the empirical work, let alone the theorising
to give it real value, to demonstrate it) in the seemingly shrinking number of
researchers who nervously tick the ‘pure basic’ box on their funding
applications, or in diminishing numbers who can be traced in the ghosts of
conferences past presenting such work. Certainly, we’d want to suggest that
the increasingly widespread use of SIGs to structure peak academic research
conferences (BERA, AERA and ERA, as well as AARE) attests to the
growing pressure to ensure that our work ‘fits’ within such normalised
definition of what is worthy of researching.
We are confident, from reading Petersen’s discussion, that research
supervision involves ‘category boundary work’, in which the discursive
practices of academic work tacitly and explicitly negotiate and legitimise
power and status differentials between research supervisors and supervisees.
Similarly, we suggest that while discursively constituted practices of
‘objectivity’ and ‘scientific rigour’ are historically contested, extensive
boundary work is enacted in challenging (or not) how research is performed.
The ‘worthiness’ of research is regulated (disciplined might be a better word,
here) externally (i.e., externally to us as a ‘research community’) in a number
of ways (as most of you will know as well as we do). At the level of
government, this occurs through the increasing proliferation and strength of
links between research and its application by industry and government,
conceptualised (in the case of government) around ‘evidence based
policy/practice’, by the encouragement if not privileging of funding
applications that address ‘needs’ of industry/government, and by the
increasing pressure on universities to seek more of their research funding
directly from industry/government in ways that strongly direct the purposes,
methods, even outcomes and ‘ownership’ of the research. The ‘old’ scheme of
core research funding for universities on the basis of publication in a very
selective range of sites (certain publishers, certain journals), the previous
government’s move to introduce the RQF and the new ERA all shared a
commitment to find procedures for regulating what research we engaged in on
the basis of providing financial capacity to keep researching – a strategy
which then flowed down to and through each university in its distribution of
research resources to different disciplines and areas of research. Institutionally
This tendency has been
widely critiqued from a
number of positions; see, for
instance, Lather, P. (2004).
This is your father's
paradigm: government
intrusion and the case of
qualitative research.
Qualitative Inquiry, 10(1)
15-34.
Petersen, Negotiating
academicity
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(at least at our university), the regulation of research is reinforced, under
conditions of resource-scarcity, by such procedures as the requirement that a
paper be accepted as a condition of receiving funding to attend such
conferences.
This links back into the issue of SIGs and what research is of worth. As we’ve
recognised already, of course, there is no uniformity across or even within
these groups. But they do share commitments to question, to suggest or to
recommend explicit strategies or solutions. Work within each of these groups
proceeds from widely shared understandings of the various phases of
problem-solving, from problem identification to strategies formulation. Work
within each of these groups proceeds from widely shared understandings of
the various phases of problem-solving, from problem identification to
strategies formulation. Moreover, research design, raw materials and product
are all assessed, graded and scored, and in differentiated markets structured
not only by disciplines by such cherished binaries as quantitative and
qualitative, positivist and interpretivist, objective and subjective.
The work research (and the regulation of research) does
Let’s not forget the multiple levels these ways of understanding, valuing and
regulating our research work at. They shape our workload. Quite concretely,
if we don’t get the appropriate level of research publication (the old DEST list
is the measuring stick) we don’t get counted as research active, and we are
eligible for an increased teaching load.  Downward spiral: limited publications
> more teaching > less time for research > limited publications. We also don’t
get research funding.  Not research active: no research funding. No track
record: no funding.
They also shape our careers. This follows fairly simply and directly from the
previous paragraph.
Less visibly, perhaps, they shape our institutions. Commonwealth funding, for
instance, and the increasing pressure to secure industry/government research
funding shapes the orientation and structure of such organisational
developments as areas of research strength, research centres, priority research
areas and the like. These impact on both organisational profiles, and the
isolation and viability as researchers of researchers whose work stands outside
these areas of adjudged worth.
A result of all these factors is that, it now seems to be much easier than it may
have been in the past to marginalise research which falls outside established
and recognised areas of research strength and worth, as these are defined both
by ourselves collectively and by government and industry.
However, they have a major impact outside our immediate and national
spheres of activity. Take, for instance, the issue of the increasing proliferation
and refinement of markers of quality, and of the intensification of links
between these markers, and institutional funding, on the one hand, and
individual career wellbeing on the other. With the globalising of the
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academic/research knowledge economy, these markers and their links to
funding impact heavily on academics and institutions outside what we are
going to call the European-North American axis.
The following email exchange illustrates the some of these issues.
[item 1] Dear Editors
Our university, like all others, puts much stress on its staff to
publish. There are 3 indices to which a journal title must belong in
order to elicit government subsidy for institutional research and in
order for staff to get promoted. These are: ISI, IBSS and a list of
local titles. (email: Morgan to Vick, 18 April 2008)
[item 2] Such journals are monopolized, of course, by very large
publishing houses… They are also very expensive, and thus place
heavy pressure on university budgets; clearly, this weighs
especially heavily in resource-poor institutions, such as many of
the universities in African nations… [Also, many] academics in
countries outside the main European-American axis (and to a
degree in non-English speaking European countries) find it difficult
to capture the voice and style of English language academic
publishing – regardless of the actual quality of the research.
Further, issues of concern to many non-western nations are not of
high priority in high status western journals, lie outside current
mainstream western academic interests and are thus even on
merit, likely to be perceived as of low relevance or value. In these
ways…non Western scholars are seriously disadvantaged. (email:
Vick, to Morgan, 23 April 2008)
[item 3] This whole issue of being outside the European-North
American axis puts other universities in a disadvantaged position.
But you see, the problem in my view is really with our government
who, while advocating all sorts of things pro-Africa and anti-
colonialism, still puts into its policy restrictive barriers that are
directly in opposition to such anti-colonial sentiments. (email:
Morgan to Vick, 24 April 2008)
What is to be done?
Ironically (and definitely not accidentally) we want to (more or less) finish up
by returning to ‘Happy Horse’ but in response to that most serious, and
consequence laden question ‘what is to be done?’ It will come as no surprise
(especially if you read the abstract) that we will not even think about trying to
answer that question. We will say, though, that we thought Happy Horse, and
Educarnival, over which it presided, did bring people together, remind them
of the not entirely serious side of life in preservice teacher education, prompt
otherwise unlikely conversations and build a general sense of good will. We
liked that. We like the way Freire came to talk about love. We like the way
Erica McWilliam (especially in Surviving best practice) opts to try to make us
think about how things are going on where we work by sneaking around our
seriousness with clever, witty, ironic parody that lets us see the absurdity and
pretentiousness of at least some of the things we do. Concluding with the
equine metaphor, we also like her reminder in her paper, ‘Post’ Haste:c.f., e.g., Fals-Borda, O. &
Mora-Osejo, L.E. (2003),
Eurocentrism and its effects:
a manifesto from Colombia.
Globalisation, Societies and
Education, 1(1), 105-107.If nothing else, this has been
a recurrent question in
revolutionary socialist
writing -- perhaps the
paradigmatic case of stuff --
writing that epitomised the
long march approach to
research -- for about a
century; see, for example,
Lenin, V.I. (1988). What is
to be done? London:Freire, P. (2005) Teachers
as cultural workers: Letters
to those who dare teach.
Trans D. Macedo, D. Koike
& A. Oliveira. Boulder,
Colo.: Westview Press.
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Plodding Research and Galloping Theory, that “[g]iven that daily educational
work is so absorbing and often so humorous and spontaneous, surely its
writing does not have to continue in a tradition of the ponderous and
predictable”. We like them because they help us to be – ever so slightly – not
so straight. To talk ourselves a little less seriously than we sometimes
otherwise catch ourselves doing. We think this helps us see things – think
things -- ‘outside the square’.
Inconclusion
We can now confess to the last paragraph of the email with which
we began:
Thinking about educarnival and Kundera made me think of a
title for a paper: ‘In defence of fluff: or, why I refuse to let my
research save the world’. What a fun paper that would be to
write and, even better, to present at AARE! (email: Vick to
Fleming, Navin, Maley & Halbert, 5 April 2008)
This was indeed the ‘origin’ (although that is itself a tricky concept) of the
paper. An off the cuff, incidental, light-handed (intended/wannabe) witticism
of sorts.
Yet, almost as a paradigm of how fluff might work, and why it might be
worth indulging, it prompted us to play. To play with writing and with the
question of how one might write that eschewed the ponderous truthfulness
that characterises much of our writing (again: our own, as individual
researchers, and collectively as a[n imagined] community of researchers) and
the desire to tell, to direct, to offer a program, a solution to some problem we
have imagined affects others. And yet, in the enthusiasm we’ve generated in
playing, we’ve found ourselves asking questions, teasing out our own
concerns, connecting them to wider issues (from globalisation to the
conditions under which we work – and the much less favourable [how’s that
for an understatement] conditions in which academics in many other parts of
the world work) in ways that we’ve found stimulating, productive and deeply
pleasurable. Again ironically, it has promoted us to engage in the serious stuff
of what we might, in the end, think of as research ethics: examining in a quite
systematic and self-demanding fashion, what our research might have to offer,
and what, in the process of establishing its own conditions of possibility and
its own claims to be taken seriously, it does, or might do, to others.
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